Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 2
Number 4 Volume 2, No. 4: November/
December 2009

Article 4

Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st Century
Terrorist Cell within the U.S.
Richard J. Hughbank
Extreme Terrorism Consulting, LLC & Counterinsurgency Training Center,
rhughbank@understandterror.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, National Security Law Commons,
and the Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons

pp. 39-52
Recommended Citation

Hughbank, Richard J.. "Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating
the 21st Century Terrorist Cell within the U.S.." Journal of Strategic
Security 2, no. 4 (2010) : 39-52.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.4.4
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss4/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st
Century Terrorist Cell within the U.S.
Abstract
Both domestic and international terrorist organizations employ guerrilla warfare tactics,
techniques, and procedures. Thus, the ability to identify and defeat the members of these
organizations, cripple their infrastructures, and disrupt their financial resources lies in the
understanding of modern guerrilla warfare as it develops in the twenty-first century within
the United States.3 The forms of asymmetric warfare4 adopted by domestic and
international terrorist groups alike is no longer intended to gain simple media exposure or
governmental manipulation; they want to make an overpowering impact by causing
massive loss of life and severe damage to infrastructure and are often motivated by
religious imperatives and political goals. As terrorism analyst Stephen Flynn has observed,
"Throughout the 20th century [Americans] were able to treat national security as
essentially an out-of-body experience. When confronted by threats, [America] dealt with
them on the turf of our allies or our adversaries. Aside from the occasional disaster and
heinous crime, civilian life [in the United States] has been virtually terror-free." With the
turn of the twenty-first century, terrorist operations have become more prevalent in the
United States and are taking shape in the form of modern guerrilla warfare, thus creating
new challenges for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. After reviewing the
origin and nature of these challenges, this article will offer some suggestions for
countering guerilla warfare in the United States.
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Guerilla Warfare & Law
Enforcement: Combating the 21st
Century Terrorist Cell within the
U.S.
By Richard J. Hughbank

"The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more
importance than the bodies of his troops."
Samuel B. Griffith II, On Guerrilla Warfare, 19611

Introduction
Both domestic and international terrorist organizations employ guerrilla
warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures.2 Thus, the ability to identify
and defeat the members of these organizations, cripple their infrastructures, and disrupt their financial resources lies in the understanding of
modern guerrilla warfare as it develops in the twenty-first century within
the United States.3 The forms of asymmetric warfare4 adopted by domestic and international terrorist groups alike is no longer intended to gain
simple media exposure or governmental manipulation; they want to make
an overpowering impact by causing massive loss of life and severe damage
to infrastructure and are often motivated by religious imperatives and
political goals.5 As terrorism analyst Stephen Flynn has observed,
"Throughout the 20th century [Americans] were able to treat national
security as essentially an out-of-body experience. When confronted by
threats, [America] dealt with them on the turf of our allies or our adversaries. Aside from the occasional disaster and heinous crime, civilian life
[in the United States] has been virtually terror-free."6 With the turn of the
twenty-first century, terrorist operations have become more prevalent in
the United States and are taking shape in the form of modern guerrilla
warfare, thus creating new challenges for federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies. After reviewing the origin and nature of these challenges, this article will offer some suggestions for countering guerilla warfare in the United States.
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Terrorist Operations within the United States
According to a book by Harvey Kushner and Bart Davis, Islamic extremist
groups have been plotting within the borders of the United States for
decades, originating with an exclusive network of educated leaders eventually known as "Mullahs."7 They note that this "secret Islamic network"
was formed during the mid-1980s "when a tightly knit group of Islamic
radicals attended the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State
University in Greensboro."8 After years of planning, recruiting, and training in decentralized terrorist cells located throughout the country, "[t]he
founding members of the secret Islamic terror network executed a longrange plan: raise money to fund terrorist activities; support Arab and
Muslim demonstrations against our government's foreign policy and its
support for Israel; infiltrate our political, economic, and military system
to conduct espionage and to buy influence; and use our universities to set
up fronts for terrorist organizations, because our academia's commitment
to Free Speech and tolerance of diversity will protect them."9
In an effort to gain a more thorough understanding of terrorism, recognize who the terrorists are, and contend with why Americans have been
attacked in their own sanctuaries, a growing cadre of academics and security professionals have recently begun developing the field of terrorism
and counterterrorism studies. However, one of the challenges yet to be
overcome in this field is the need for a common definition. As one scholar
has observed, "[W]e seek to define terrorism so as to be better able to cope
with it, [but we] cannot begin to counter effectively that which we are
unable to fully comprehend or agree on as to its nature."10 This lack of a
universal definition poses issues in identifying, defending against, and
ultimately defeating terrorist acts in the War on Terrorism.
Not only is it imperative that commonly accepted definitions of domestic
and international terrorism exist, it is equally important to understand
the methods of terrorist warfare and how they are actually conducted as
well as what type of individuals—even among U.S. citizens—would join a
cause that uses terrorism to achieve seemingly unobtainable objectives.
As Benjamin Netanyahu—a former soldier in an elite antiterrorist unit in
the Israeli Army and former prime minister of Israel—has noted, "The
current breed of interlocking domestic and international terrorists is certainly not to be taken lightly. They know the West well and have developed strategies designed to take advantage of all its weaknesses."11
Identifying the enemies' tactics and their motivational means for executing such heinous acts of political- and religious-based violence against an
innocent civilian population will prove invaluable in the fight against
domestic and international terrorism within the United States.
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Guerrilla Warfare Tactics
Tactics that have been successfully employed by small guerrilla-fighting
forces for centuries are quickly becoming a serious problem, as domestic
and international terrorist groups are utilizing stand-off, overt (high profile), and covert (low profile) tactics to accomplish their end state with little regard for those outside their organizations. This type of terroristoriented asymmetric warfare is currently used all over the world, even
though such a strategy rarely leads to the type of complete victory envisioned by its adherents. Understanding guerrilla warfare requires the recognition of how terrorist cells operate within their political and religious
ideologies and within their varying environmental battlefields.
According to historians Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, guerrilla
warfare has historically been viewed as
. . . a war of the masses, a war of the people. The guerrilla band
[has been] an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people.
It draws great force from the mass of the people themselves.
Guerrilla warfare [has been] used by the side which is supported
by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of
arms for use in defense against oppression.12
Guerilla leaders such as Mao Tse-tung in China, Ernesto "Che" Guevera in
Latin America, and Carlos Marighella in Brazil, have revolutionized the
art of small-unit warfare against larger and more adequately resourced
opponents. Their decentralized campaign tactics have led to many victories over mighty armies and have eventually been adopted by many terrorist groups such as the Baader-Meinhoff Gang (later known as the Red
Faction Army) operating in West Germany.13
Guerrilla warfare has become the principal design from which terrorist
cells are shaping their operations from preparation to recruitment to execution. It has historically been a proven blueprint for various levels of tactical success and always provides the terrorist an opportunity to launch
"himself against the conditions of the reigning institutions at a particular
moment and dedicate himself with all the vigor that circumstances permit
to breaking the mold of these institutions."14 As Mao Tse-tung wrote
many years ago, "A trained and disciplined guerrilla is much more than a
patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated . . .
homemade bomb. His indoctrination begins even before he is taught to
shoot accurately, and it is unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal
and politically alert fighting man."15
41

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 4

Journal of Strategic Security

Twenty-First Century Terrorism as Guerilla Warfare
Domestic and international terrorist groups located within the United
States are demonstrating the various guerrilla warfare techniques of old
as they are setting out to achieve their political and religious objectives.
From the development of the organization through the execution of the
attack, these groups are organized in a manner—and utilize tactics, techniques, and procedures—consistent with the operational phases of a traditional insurgency. These offensive measures are initiated whenever the
opportunity for power, control, and socioeconomic influence favor the
aggressor. Other operational fundamentals include influencing the need
to defend multiple potential targets, the massive consumption of critical
resources, sacrificing counter (offensive) measures, and the loss of political and law enforcement initiatives. In essence, insurgents seek to reduce
resources and diminish any willingness to protect civilian communities
through attrition and exhaustion.16 One last and extremely critical impact
could include the alienation of (local) communities toward law enforcement officials and local and federal governments.
Guerilla warfare groups generally organize their activities around seven
areas: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-up,
combat employment, and demobilization. Each is described in more
detail below.

Preparation
Terrorist groups first look for a location from which to base their operations and begin recruiting. Location is critical, as they require an environment conducive to recruiting as well as privacy for planning their attacks.
Community selection and socioeconomic structure are two critical factors
in the choice of location. Like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, terrorist groups form decentralized cells that consist of a
select few individuals who can blend into an urbanized community and
begin the recruiting process. The members of these sleeper cells17 will
blend into their chosen society by obtaining jobs, paying bills, and acting
and speaking like the indigenous population within the neighborhood for
months and years while preparing and recruiting for the next attack. The
socioeconomic structure of a community is crucial to a cell's intelligence
preparation in a given area of operation.
As Daniel Pipes notes, although most would expect the militant Islamic to
entice those individuals from the lower end of the social strata, "research
finds precisely the opposite [to be] true. To the extent that economic factors explain who becomes Islamic, they point to the fairly well off, not the
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poor . . . . Those who back militant Islamic organizations also tend to be
well off. They come more often from the richer city than the poorer countryside."18

Initial Contact
Over time, the organizational structure begins to take shape, and positions within the cell are filled with recruits from the local community. In
order to recruit locals to meet their specific needs, cell members set clandestine operations in motion to begin identifying those who meet the special needs within a particular cell. As Tse-tung observed, guerrilla
warfare's "basic element is man, and man is more complex than any of his
machines."19 While looking for those individuals who might meet their
strategic and tactical needs for future terrorist operations, cell members
integrate themselves into the daily lives of their target population with
absolute discretion, giving the appearance of the average U.S. citizen
residing in "Anytown, U.S.A." Marighella believed that urban guerillas
would have neither the means nor the capability to maintain a job for very
long, forcing them to begin expropriation tactics over long periods of
time. He also spoke of the importance for guerilla insurgents to learn how
to live among the indigenous people in their operational area, employing
extreme discretion as they gradually integrate into their new environment. Once they have comfortably maneuvered themselves into the everyday events of their chosen community, then, and only then, will they
begin their initial contact.

Infiltration
Infiltration is defined as complete submersion into a society. In places
such as Dearborn, Michigan; Brooklyn, New York; Hancock, New York;
and Buena Vista, Colorado (the last two cities refer directly to cells of the
Jaamat ul-Faruqa movement), Islamic jihad extremists have infiltrated
and begun recruiting, training, and plotting their next terrorist attack
against the United States—all in the name of Islamic purification through
violence and destruction. A critical factor for the development of the cell's
structure in this stage is the process of isolating promising recruits in U.S.
society who may harbor ill feelings toward either the current government
or Christians and Jews. They begin to quietly spread their religious and
political beliefs as a more acceptable alternative to the democratic
governments in the evil empire of the Western world. Christianity is
dismissed in their eyes as a lesser religion, or no religion at all, and the
Islamic faith is praised as the only righteous path to Allah (Arabic for
God), as revealed through the last prophet Muhammad and his universal
and timeless message.
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Additionally, these groups engage in criminal acts such as fraud, burglary,
racketeering, and illegal use and distribution of drugs (narco-terrorism)
in an effort to financially provide for future training and tactical operations. Other methods of gathering funds to further facilitate their jihad
are through the production and sale of militant Islamic propaganda during their teachings, training, and prayer meetings.

Organization
Once the infiltration phase in an area of operations has been established
and deemed satisfactory to the needs of the newly formed insurgent
group, the terrorist cell's organization begins to take shape. The traditional guerrilla forces of Afghanistan, Brazil, China, and Vietnam grew in
size equaling two hundred to one thousand-person units, but terrorist
cells forming in the United States are significantly smaller and "stovepiped" in design, mostly due to the urban terrain and environments in
which they have chosen to conduct their operations. This organizational
technique is better known as decentralization, or networked decentralization. With decentralized cells working toward a common objective, those
caught during the commission of an illegal act are unable to give any
operational intelligence on other sections of their cell or on the existence
of other cells. A terrorist cell evolves in both size and sophistication as
new recruits enter their training and progress to any of the cell's three
organizational forces: auxiliary, intelligence, or operational.

Build-up
Although the name of this phase implies there is a massing or increase in
size of the cell, the size will vary with each location (and sociological
environment), organization, and intended mission. As stated earlier,
unlike the traditionally sizable guerrilla forces dating back to Guevara,
Marighella, and Tse-tung, twenty-first-century terrorist cells located
within the United States are organized in much smaller and more elusive
elements in order to suit their needs for covert operations at every phase
of their insurgency. Furthermore, recruits with special skills are also
examined more heavily when considered for recruitment, unlike the
average guerrilla fighter in previous wars. As Loveman and Davies
observe, drawing on the doctrine originally espoused by Guevara,
"Guerilla warfare, the basis of the struggle of a people to redeem itself, has
diverse characteristics, different facets, even though the essential
liberation remains the same."20 Understanding this philosophy is critical
for law enforcement agencies throughout the country that must identify
and disrupt terrorist cells within their jurisdictions. Guevara's teachings
still hold true in the forming and training of both domestic and
44

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss4/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.4.4

Hughbank: Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st Century Te

Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st Century Terrorist Cell within the U.S.

international terrorist organizations located in the United States. Another
important parallel between guerrilla warfare of old and today's terrorist
cells is that this form of war "is a war of the masses, a war of the people."21
While terrorist cells will utilize this phase to further develop their
organizations, they will only have a select few who are deceived by their
fatwa22 to attack and kill other Americans in their own country.

Combat Employment
Once a cell has determined that the time has come to conduct "combat"
operations, plans will become actions set into motion with finite precision, leaving little room for identification or interception by first responders. The asymmetric actions of typical guerilla warfare are a product of
months of detailed planning, resourcing, organizing, and rehearsing.
Although there are varying social-strata levels joining and participating in
terrorist acts, make no mistake that the delivery platform of this horrific
weapon of terrorism will result from highly trained and dedicated Islamic
jihadists who truly believe their actions are righteous and for the betterment of the Islamic nation.

Demobilization
Although the term demobilization infers that terrorist forces are maneuvering from wartime to a peacetime position through the disbanding of
their organization, this is not the posture referenced here. Demobilization
during guerrilla warfare is more likely to occur in the form of a dismembering of the operational cell responsible for the actual terrorist attack—
that is, if the members do not die for their cause (e.g., homicide bombings) or get caught during the commission of their criminal act. It could
also be concluded that the parent cell itself could stand down and relocate
to another area or region if the situation proved dangerous to its existence
and execution of ibn Ladin's fatwa. The organization's decentralized
operational control allows the separate cells to function independently,
providing uninterrupted and continuous operations. In order to successfully terminate a local cell's operational status, a way must found to demobilize the actual base facilities where they recruit, train, plan, and project
terror against their intended targets.
This key cell adjustment will not be undertaken lightly by terrorist organizations, as it involves several critical moving pieces not only in terms of
the destruction of its current base of operations, but also in the process of
executing the first five operational phases over what could prove a lengthy
and costly amount of time. Therefore, if a cell cannot be identified and
totally eradicated by a country's intelligence and law enforcement agen45
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cies, the next best option may be to cause its members to believe that they
must demobilize and move to another location.

Strategic Challenges for Countering Guerilla
Warfare
Over two hundred years after the first Spanish guerrillas, terrorist groups
are still thriving on the principles that have made guerrilla warfare such a
tremendous and potentially successful tactic of fighting more with less.
However, there are several critical differences in how modern guerrilla
warfare is executed in the United States today, as compared with other
countries in the past:
1. The foundation of modern terrorist cells could be either domestic or
international in nature (that is, not always "homegrown"). This might
appear irrelevant at first, but while most domestic terrorist groups are
discontented from the government, they are not necessarily looking to
cause massive loss of life (Timothy McVeigh's terrorist attack of the
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City is clearly an exception).
International cells consisting of militant Islamic groups conducting
guerrilla operations in another country are not only looking to have an
impact on the government, they are also plotting to attack soft targets
with the intent of destroying critical economic infrastructure and cause
enormous loss of life in order to carry out the following fatwa issued by
ibn Ladin on February 23, 1998: "The ruling to kill the Americans and
their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."23
2. While the cause is against a perceived oppressive government, it is not,
nor will it ever be, supported by a trained, professional army constituted of U.S. citizens. Guerrilla armies in other countries have always
depended on a "regular" army to sustain their governmental opposition, and the lack of popular local support will ultimately minimize the
opportunities for guerrilla-style warfare to win the wars of either attrition or annihilation, especially in a foreign country.
3. Terrorists are fighting for "religious ideologies" rather than for "civilizations." In a fight for religious ideological pursuits, the identified battlefield must contain multiple supporters in these perceived ideologies
in order to successfully sustain the cause and have any hope for longterm success. While there are over one thousand two hundred mosques
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with some two million American Muslim participants located throughout the United States,24 clearly very few members have the desire to
express their religious and political beliefs through ibn Ladin's fatwa.
4. As Therese Delpeche notes, terrorist acts will "contribute to reshaping
international relations,"25 and not just in the immediate area in which
they are conducting operations. If terrorism was to successfully manipulate U.S. citizens and subdue or defeat the government of the United
States, every other country in the world would feel the ripple effect of
the most powerful nation in the world collapsing to a weaker enemy,
and other economies would ultimately face unrecoverable losses as
well as an onslaught of follow-on terrorist attacks. The world will not
stand by and watch terrorism erode the United States to the point of
defeat.
5. According to Delpeche, "The boundaries between military and civil
defense are being blurred. The increasing need to protect civilians from
terrorists attacks . . . will lead the most-developed countries to give a
new priority to civil defense, making it harder for the terrorist[s] to
strike in the middle of cities and easier for [the] government to deal
with limited unconventional attacks."26 Governments today are better
equipped with intelligence-gathering techniques and technological
defense mechanisms to fight modern guerilla fighters. The freedom of
movement within a city or state has been limited by these modern
counterinsurgency techniques, causing terrorist cells to move at a
slower pace and spend more time planning and training for their next
attack. The greater the degree of precision placed on terrorists
increases the opportunity for local law enforcement agencies and other
first responders to act or react to their attacks and potentially prevent
an attack from occurring.

Closing the Training Camps, Mosques, Compounds,
and Schools
While militant Islamism has been a force to contend with throughout the
world for many years, it is also becoming more prevalent in the United
States. According to Kushner and Davis:
It isn't an accident that many U.S. mosques have become appendages of worldwide jihad against the West. The number of Muslims
coming here rose rapidly after the United States revised immigration laws in the mid-1960s. The number of mosques and Islamic
community centers grew over that time, by some estimates from
47
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about fifty at the end of World War II to more than twelve hundred today. The role of the mosque has also changed—from
Americanized "cultural clubs" of earlier immigrants to conservative, religion-oriented institutions that manipulate the national
and cultural identities of new immigrants in an effort to avoid
their inclusion in mainstream America.27
These terrorism analysts also point to a common thread that emerges
from recent cases brought against confirmed or alleged Islamic terror
cells in the United States—the connection between the terror cells' members and a local mosque.28 State and federal law enforcement agencies
must initiate and maintain aggressive intelligence-gathering operations
with varying profiles, specifically targeting those individuals and organizations where militant Muslims teach others to execute ibn Ladin's fatwa.
"Islamberg," a training camp utilized by the Jamaat ul-Faruqa movement in Hancock, New York, is a prime example of how militant Islamic
teachings have penetrated the fabric of the United States' society and
begun the recruiting and transformation of Islamic Americans against
their democratic government. As Cooper notes, "The youngest members
of Islamic society are being exposed to intolerance and hate in the Islamic
religious schools from the earliest grades on."29
Delpeche recently observed that having the ability to contain violence has
always been the key to security.30 Stephen Flynn agrees, arguing that
. . . the threat is ongoing, and [the United States] must be doing
more right now to limit the consequences of future acts of terror.
It will take time to implement well-conceived, layered security
measures that protect the critical foundations of [the American]
society. [Americans] have to make judgments about [their] most
immediate vulnerabilities, identify what stop-gap protective
measures [they] can implement in a hurry, and develop and
exercise plans to guide [their] response when the next attack
materialize.31

Conclusion
Terrorism, by its nature, seeks out and exploits its opponents' weaknesses. Terrorist cells will only execute when they believe the tactical
advantage is clearly theirs and that, as Tse-tung dictates, "chances for victory are weighted heavily in their favor."32 The asymmetric warfare tactics
practiced by domestic and international terrorist organizations have
achieved some success over the years in various countries throughout the
48
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world. Arguably the most powerful and influential nation in the free
world, the United States must refuse to concede to such heinous acts of
violence, as its second- and third-order impacts could prove detrimental
to the political and economic status of nations throughout the world. As
Stephen Flynn observes:
The reason that catastrophic terrorism holds such potential as a
means to wage war on the United States is not simply because
these attacks can inflict damage to systems we depend on; it is
because our enemies have good reason to believe that a successful
act of terror on American soil will trigger a reaction which the
U.S. Government exacerbates localized destruction with substantial self-inflicted national and even global costs.33
In order to pursue a successful counteroffensive against terrorism, the
United States must analyze previous defense strategies in overseas areas
of operation and begin to concentrate on the varying phases of a terrorist
organization's movement within its own borders, as well as on its
understanding of what Kushner and Davis describe as "the terrorist's
language, culture, history, methods, and psychology."34 Furthermore, the
leaders of this democratic nation should consider how they might prevent
others from joining these militant Muslim organizations as willing
participants by improving the socioeconomic welfare of those subject to
easy recruitment.
We are at a point in our history where "timidity" will prove an undesirable
and fatal flaw in the defense of this nation. The days of Americans feeling
safe within their geographical borders has come to an end, as militant
Islamic jihadists penetrate the United States' societal footprint and live
among their prey. Outdated security against the average criminal element
will neither prevent nor protect against modern-day criminal attacks by a
well-funded and highly trained terrorist cell. According to Flynn's analysis, "[Americans] must create the kind of structure that widens the
breadth and quality of civic participation in making America safe. The
nation, not just the federal government, must be organized for the long,
deadly struggle against terrorism."35
The War on Terror has forced the United States to face its enemies on its
own soil for the first time since the Civil War, thus forcing its strategies of
defense to alter as it considers the long-term effects of both massive wartime damage to infrastructure and loss of civilian life. The world is anxiously standing by to see just how effective the United States is in
handling terrorism inside its own borders as well as in other foreign countries, as its actions (or lack thereof) will forever shape the diplomatic and
49
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economic policies sustained between itself and other governments around
the world. The United States cannot afford to lose this war.
A version of this article previously appeared as a chapter in a book published by: Forest, et. al. (June 2007). Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century [Three Volumes]: International Perspectives.
Chapter titled "Guerilla Warfare and Law Enforcement: Combating the
21st Century Terrorist Cell within the United States." Praeger Security
International, Chapter 12, pp. 235–252.
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